In the furniture trade, as in any other, it is easy to assume that a strong brand will carry a business through structural change and difficult times – but John D Moulton, author of The Instant Sales Director – Taking Aim at The Sales Director's Chair, has seen enough over the years to know that this belief is not just flawed, it’s dangerous …
One of the most instructive examples came early in my career, as an area sales representative with the Slumberland Beds brand of old.
The brand was so strong, I could hardly believe my luck when I was offered the post. My euphoria carried me through basic training – and collapsed instantly on my first call.
No sooner had I introduced myself, than the owner waded into the long list of reasons he would never buy from the company again – not just joking that little old ladies had been seen running off with these new ‘lightweight’ mattresses, but that the Slumberland management had just fired my predecessor of some 20-year service so that he and many of his colleagues could be replaced by a gang of stack-em-high-and-sell-em-fast grocery trade types.
It was difficult for me to comprehend how this buyer was prepared let such a major brand go. To put this in perspective, at its peak, Slumberland held around 26% of the UK market – a level of recognition few other companies, in any sector, came close to. Customers would walk into stores asking for a Slumberland in much the same way people ask for a Hoover. By any measure, it was a dominant position.
Yet within a relatively short period, that position was to be dramatically eroded – not because consumer demand had fallen, but because the business misread its market.
A decision was made at senior level to move toward a lighter product construction. From a manufacturing and cost perspective, the thinking may have appeared sound. From the customer’s perspective, it was anything but.
At the time, mattress weight was widely associated with quality. A heavier bed was perceived as better built. That belief may or may not have been technically accurate, but it was deeply embedded in the trade’s mindset.
Crucially, the decision to change direction was made without meaningful consultation with the retail base – the very people who presented products to consumers every day. They often used ‘weight’ as a major selling feature, and simply did not believe their customers would embrace the new product.
The result was predictable. For all its strength, the market rejected the direction the brand had taken. Independent retailers, then the company’s mainstay, turned their backs in droves and the new-style, out-of-town, big-box stores, previously denied the product, took up the slack in volume – but at a price. Market share fell sharply, from around 26% to nearer 6% in under four years. A change in senior management did nothing to stem the tide, and a sell-off became inevitable.
I saw similar patterns repeated across the industry as the years went on. Strong brands, confident in their reputation, making decisions in isolation from the realities of the market they served.
The lesson is a simple one, but it is often overlooked. A brand does not define the market. The market defines the brand. No matter how established a name may be, it remains dependent on the perceptions and expectations of the people buying the product – and the retailers selling it.
The most effective sales leaders I have worked with understood this. They did not rely on brand strength alone. They stayed close to the trade, listened carefully, and adjusted accordingly. Those who did not paid the price, sooner or later.
